[32 HL.TORY OF GREECE. and their reltasts are very good: in the action which now took place under the walls of Spartolus, the Athenian hoplites defeated those of the enemy, but their cavalry and their light troops were completely worsted by the Chalkidic. These latter, still farther strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ven- tured even to attack the Athenian hoplites, ivho thought it pru- dent to fall back upon the two companies left in reserve to guard the baggage. During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidic horse and light-armed, who retired when the Athe- nians turned upon them, but attacked them on all sides when on their march ; and employed missiles so effectively that the re- treating hoplites could no longer maintain a steady order, but took to flight, and sought refuge at Potidaea. Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force, together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, and the expedition returned in dishonor to Athens. 1 In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies were more successful. The repulse of the Ambrakiots from the Amphilochian Argos, during the preceding year, had only exasperated them and induced them to conceive still larger plans of aggression against both the Akarnanians and Athenians. In concert with their mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed upon the Lacedaemonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of Akarnania, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the Akarnanians from concentrating their forces in any one point, and put each of their townships upon an isolated self-defence ; so that all of them might be over- powered in succession, and detached, together with Kephallenia and Zakynthus, from the Athenian alliance. The fleet of Phor- mio at Naupaktus, consisting only of twenty triremes, was accounted incompetent to cope with a Peloponnesian fleet such as might be fitted out at Corinth. There was even some hopo that the important station at Naupaktus might itself be taken, so as to expel the Athenians completely from those parts. The scheme of operations now projected was far more compre- hensive than anything which the war had yet afforded. The land-force of the Ambrakiots, together with their neighbors and
1 Thueyd. ii, 79.
