Page:History of Greece Vol VI.djvu/491

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.

SCHEME OF CKASIDAS. 469 there was no enemy prepared to fight, he took his time to survey the ground ; while his soldiers became more and more relaxed and careless in their trim, some even advancing close up to the walls and gates. Hut this state of affairs was soon materially changed. Brasi- das knew that the Athenian hoplites would not long endure the tedium of absolute inaction, and he calculated that by affecting extreme backwardness and apparent fear, he should seduce KJeon into some inc&Jtious movement of which advantage might be taken. His station on Mount Kerdylium enabled him to watch the march of the Athenian army from Eion, and when he saw them pass up along the road outside of the Long Wall of Amphip- olis, 1 he immediately crossed the river with his forces and entered the town. But it was not his intention to march out and offer them open battle ; for his army, though equal in number to theirs, was extremely inferior in arms and equipment ; 2 in which points the Athenian force now present was so admirably provided, that his own men would not think themselves a match for it, if the two armies faced each other in open field. He relied altogether on the effect of sudden sally and well-timed surprise, when the Athenians should have been thrown into a feeling of contemptu- ous security by an exaggerated show of impotence in their enemy. Having offered the battle sacrifice at the temple of Athene, Brasidas called his men together to address to them the usual encouragements prior to an engagement. After appealing to the Dorian pride of his Peloponnesians, accustomd to triumph over lonians, he explained to them his design of relying upon a bold and sudden movement with comparatively small numbers, against the Athenian army when not prepared for it, 3 when their courago point higher than the summit of the hill and wall of Amphipolis. Besides, even if he had reached a higher point of the mountain, he could not well talk of " bringing down battering-machines from, that point." 1 Thucyd. v, 6. Bpaaitiac Se uvTeKa-&t]TO Kal aiirbf tni T^ KspdvXiu iarl 6e TO x u P iov TOVTO TUV 'Apyihiuv, irepav TOV iroTafiov, ov T oXd UTCEX.OI rf/<; 'A;i0i7r6Aeuf, Kal tear e (jtaiv era iravra aiiro&ev, VOTE OVK at

  • /ta#ei> avTo&ev bpfiufiKvos o K3,ewv r<> arparu, etc.

Thucyd. v, 8.

  • Thucyd. v, 9. Tovf yap havriovf eiKufc KaTafpovr/aec T e ripCn Kal OVK

v ehmffavrac uc uv <'