Page:History of Greece Vol VI.djvu/78

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.

56 HISTORY CF GREECE. and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians wrre com pelled towards the end of the summer to send a second armament to Cape Aktium, for the defence of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. The Korkyrnean fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimme, but no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded. 1 Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, together with the dispersion of the settlers whom they had brought together ; and though their original project was frus- trated by the loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves, for two entire years after the battle, in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purposes : and in particular, they sent round not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of sea- men. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the battle : and the entire fleet, when reinforced by the allies, amounted to not less than one hundred and fifty sail : twenty-seven triremes from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from Elis, as many from Leukas, and one from Anaktorium. Each of these allied squadrons had officers of its own, while the Corinthian Xeno- kleides and four others were commanders-in-chief. 2 But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to the Korkyra?ans, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies which that city could command, and her extensive influence throughout Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedosmon : it had always been their pride and policy to main- tain a separate line of action, which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their island ; from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands in tho

1 Thucyd. i, 29, 30 * Thucyd. i, 31-46.