10 HISTORY OF GREECE the Spartans themselves. 1 Unhappily it formed a precedent for the future, and was closely copied afterwards by Thebes ; 2 fore- boding but too clearly the short career which Grecian political independence had to run. That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous answer sent by the Athenians 3 to the offers of Mardonius in 479 B. c., refusing in the midst of ruin present and prospective, all temptation to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic fellowship, that sentiment which had been during the two following genera- tions the predominant inspiration of Athens, and had also been powerful, though always less powerful, at Sparta, was now, in the former, overlaid by more pressing apprehensions, and in the latter completely extinguished. Now it was to the leading states that Greece had to look, for holding up the great banner of Pan- hellenic independence ; from the smaller states nothing more could be required than that they should adhere to and defend it, when upheld. 4 But so soon as Sparta was seen to solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept (even under constraint), the proclamation under the king's hand and seal brought down by Antalkidas, that banner was no longer a part of the public emblems of Gre- ' Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35. 3 Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.
- Herodot. viii, 143.
The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys, of the reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of refusal to Alexander (viii, 144), are not less impressive than the answer itself. But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the Spartans in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read in contrast with it that speech which their envoys address to the Athenians, in order to induce the latter to stand out against the temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142). 4 The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets forth emphati- cally the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive principles, on which it becomes Sparta to model her public conduct, as altogether different from the simple considerations of prudence and security which are suitable to humbler states like Corinth, Epidaurus, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105, 106, 110). Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities of the convention of Antalkidas, not thrust upon Sparta by superior force, but both originally sued out, and finally enforced by her, for her own political ends. Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii, (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about the dissen jion of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful effects
