PHILIP'S CORRUPTION. 319 to purchase such auxiliaries, than to employ paid spies in his operations of war : l while the prevalent political antipathies at Athens, coupled with the laxity of public morality in individuals, would render it perfectly practicable to obtain suitable instru ments. That not only at Athens, but also at Amphipolis, Poti- dsua, Olynthus and elsewhere, Philip achieved his successes, partly by purchasing corrupt partisans among the leaders of his enemies is an assertion so intrinsically probable, that we may readily believe it, though advanced chiefly by unfriendly witnesses. Such corruption alone, indeed, would not have availed him, but it was eminently useful when combined with well-employed force and military genius. CHAPTER LXXXVIII. EUBOIC AND OLYNTHIAN WARS. IP even in Athens, at the date of the first Philippic of Demos- thenes, the uneasiness about Philip was considerable, much more serious had it become among his neighbors the Olynthians. He had gained them over, four years before, by transferring to them 'ihe territory of Anthemus and the still more important town of Potidae, captured by his own arms from Athens. Grateful for these cessions, they had become his allies in his war with Athens, whom they hated on every ground. But a material change had since taken place. Since the loss of Methone, Athens, expelled from the coast of Thrace and Macedonia, had ceased to be a hostile neighbor, or to inspire alarm to the Olynthians ; while the immense increase in the power of Philip, combined with his ability and ambi'ion alike manifest, had overlaid their gratitude for the past by a sentiment of fear for the future. It was but too ' Compare the advice of the Thebans to Mardonius in 479 B. c. during tac Persian invasion of Greece (Herodot. ix. 2).
