are marvellous and incomparable. The strategy, tactics, and organization of the operations give the reader of the story the impression that in all these matters perfection was attained. The professional military critic may justly blame Alexander, as his own officers blamed him, for excessive display of personal heroism, and needless exposure to danger of the precious life upon which the safety of the whole army depended, but criticism is silenced by admiration, and by the reflection that the example set by the king's reckless daring was of incalculable value as a stimulus and encouragement to troops often ready to despair of success.
The descent of the rivers to the ocean through the territories of civilized and well-armed nations, admittedly the best soldiers in the East, and the voyage of Nearchos from the Indus to the Tigris, may fairly be described as unqualified successes. The third great enterprise, the retirement of the army led by Alexander in person through Gedrosia, would have been equally prosperous but for the occurrence of physical difficulties, which could not be foreseen, owing to the imperfection of the information at the king's command. But even this operation was not a failure. Notwithstanding the terrible privations endured and the heavy losses suffered, the army emerged from the deserts as an organized and disciplined force, and its commander's purpose was attained.
On the whole, Alexander's Indian campaign was a success. It was not really marred by the mutiny at the Hyphasis. If his soldiers had permitted him to
