and the violence of the flood had increased. Careful study of the ground had convinced Alexander that the best chance of crossing in safety was to be found near a sharp bend in the river about sixteen miles marching distance above his camp, at a point where his embarkation would be concealed by a bluff and an island covered with forest. Having arrived at this decision, Alexander acted upon it, not only, as Arrian justly remarks, with "marvellous audacity," but with consummate prudence and precaution.
He left Krateros with a considerable force, including the Taxilan contingent of five thousand men, to guard the camp near Jihlam, and supplied him with precise instructions as to the manner in which he should use this reserve force to support the main attack. Halfway between the standing camp and the chosen crossing-place three generals were stationed with the mercenary cavalry and infantry, and had orders to cross the river as soon as they should perceive the Indians to be fairly engaged in action. All sections of the army were kept in touch by a chain of sentries posted along the bank.
When all these precautionary arrangements had been completed, Alexander in person took command of a picked force of about eleven or twelve thousand men, including the foot-guards, hypaspist infantry, mounted archers, and five thousand cavalry of various kinds, with which to effect the passage. In order to escape observation, he marched by night at some distance from the bank, and his movements were
