the result of his plans was, as Clive wrote Lord Bute in 1762, that "we accomplished for ourselves against the French exactly everything that the French intended to accomplish for themselves against us." It is certain, moreover, that the conception of an Indian empire had already been formed by others besides Dupleix, and that more than one clear-headed observer had perceived how easily the whole country might be subdued by a European power.
It is easy to understand that when France and England, in 1753, determined to stop the fighting between their two Companies in India, they were actuated by the obvious expediency of terminating a protracted war between the representatives of two nations who were at peace in Europe, and of compelling their Indian governors to retire from politics and revert to trade. On the scene of action neither side had as yet gained any decisive advantage. In 1754 the French and English had both received reinforcements that brought their respective European forces up to about two thousand men each; but Orme says that the English troops were so superior in quality to the French that, if hostilities had continued, the English must have prevailed. The presence of an English squadron on the coast was also an argument, he observes, that inclined M. Godeheu toward pacific views.
On the other hand, the French held a much larger territory than the English, and apparently a more considerable political connection among the native states. The English governor at Madras, in transmitting to the
