possessions, her traditional jealousy of interference by the only European nation that had repeatedly challenged her ascendency in India naturally reached its acutest stage during a desperate war with France.
The last act of Lord Cornwallis before he left India, in 1793, had been to seize all the French settlements; Ceylon was taken from the Dutch in 1796; and the English now treated any symptom of an understanding with France, or even of a leaning in that direction, as a dangerous spark to be extinguished at once. Sir John Shore (Lord Teignmouth), who held the Governor-Generalship ad interim until Lord Mornington arrived in 1798, was a very cautious and overprudent politician. Being averse, on principle, to extending British relations or responsibilities, he refused, rather ungenerously, to assist the Nizam when the Marathas attacked him, thereby estranging our principal ally and encouraging our principal rivals. When the Nizam, who was very anxious for a British alliance, proposed a defensive treaty on the basis of mutual territorial guarantee, the English government drew back, not wishing to defend Haidarabad at the risk of offending the Marathas, who might retaliate by a league with Tippu.
The consequences of this half-hearted attitude were serious; for the Marathas invaded the Haidarabad country, dispersed the Nizam's army, and at Kurdla, in 1795, enforced on him an ignominious surrender to very extortionate terms. This triumph brought the Marathas a considerable increase of strength and reputation, while the Nizam was so deeply incensed at our desertion