FOR TLA CE. 513 ing to the degree of enhancement or depression in the psy- chical state which they call forth. From the feelings are formed concepts, from concepts judgments ; and the abstrac- tion of the categorical imperative is a highly derivative phenomenon and a very late result, although the feeling of oughtness or of moral obligation, which accompanies the correct estimation of values and bids us prefer spiritual to sensuous delights and the general good to our own welfare, grows necessarily out of the inner nature of the human soul. There are two sources of religion : one theoretical, for the idea of God ; the other practical, for the worship of God. We are impelled to the assumption of a suprasensible, an unconditioned, a providence, on the one hand, by the desire for a unitary conclusion for our fragmentary knowledge of the world ; and, on the other, by moral need, by our unsatisfied longing after the good. The attributes which we ascribe to God are taken from experience, the abstract attributes from being in general, the naturalistic from the world, the spiritual from man. As an inevitable outcome of the transformation of religious feelings into representa- tions, and one which is harmless because of the unmistak- ableness of their symbolic character, the anthropomorphic predicates, through which we think the Deity as personal, themselves establish the superiority of theism over panthe- ism. The object of religion, moreover, is accessible only to the subjective certitude of feeling which is given by faith, and not to scientific knowledge. Feuerbach's anthropological standpoint will be discussed below. Like Friedrich Ueberweg (1826-71 ; professor in Konigsberg; System of Logic, 1857, 5th ed., edited by J. B. Meyer, 1882 — English translation, 1871), Karl Fortlage was strongly influenced in his psychological views by Beneke. Born in 1806 at Osnabriick, and at his death in 1881 a professor in Jena, Fortlage shared with Beneke an impersonality of character, as well as the fate of meeting with less esteem from his contemporaries than he merited [by the seriousness and originality of his thinking. To his System of Psychology, 1855, in two volumes, he added, as it Iwere, a third volume, his Contributions to Psychology, 1875, llbesides psychological lectures of a more popular cast
