Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/543

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ME TA PH YSTCS. S 2 1 dom, as absolute becoming — are alike absurd. We can escape these contradictions only by the bold decision to conceive the quality of the existent as unchangeable. For the truly existent there is no change whatever. It remains, however, to explain the appearance of change, in which the wand of decomposition and the "together" again proves its magic power. Supported by the motley mani- foldness of phenomena, we posit real beings as qualitatively different, and view this diversity as partial contraposition ; we resolve, e. g., the simple quality a into the elements X -- 2, and a second quality b into j — 2. So long as the individual things remain by themselves, the opposition of the qualities will not make itself evident. But as soon as they come together, something takes place — now the oppo- sites {-- 2 and — 2) seek to destroy or at least to disturb each other. The reals defend themselves against the dis- turbance which would follow if the opposites could destroy each other, by each conserving its simple, unchangeable quality, i. e., by simply remaining self-identical. Self-con- servation against threatened disturbances from without (it may be compared to resistance against pressure) is the only real change, and apparent change, the empirical changes of things, to be explained from this. That which changes is only the relations between the beings, as a thing maintains itself now against this and now against that other thing; the relations, however, and their change are something entirely contingent and indifferent to the existent. In itself the self-conservation of a real is as uniform as the quality which is conserved, but in virtue of the changing relations (the variety of the disturbing things) it can express itself for the observer in manifold ways as force. The real itself changes as little as a paint- ing changes, for instance, when, seen near at hand, the figures in it are clearly distinguished, while for the distant observer, on the contrary, they run together into an indis- tinguishable chaos. Change has no meaning in the sphere of the existent. Anyone who speaks thus has denied change, not deduced it. Among the many objections experienced by Her- bart's endeavor to explain the empirical fact of change