Page:History of Woman Suffrage Volume 1.djvu/163

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Partiality wrong in Principle.
147

holds real estate in her own name, in title, and in title only, it is hers; for her husband even then controls its profits, and if she leave it so, it will descend to her heirs so long as she has an heir, and so long as she can trace the descent. But if she suffers her husband to sell that property and receive the money, it instantly becomes his; and instead of descending to her heirs, it descends to his heirs. This the gentleman will not deny. Now, we readily admit, that while the wife abides by the statutes, of which our article has given us an abstract, her husband can not take the property from her, he can only take the use of it. But the moment she departs from the statute, she comes under the provisions of the common law; which, when they do not conflict, is equally binding in Ohio, as the statute law. And in this case the common and statute Jaws do not conflict. Departing from the statute, that is, suffering her property to be exchanged, the provision is thus: (Here follows the common law, taken from the petition). I have nothing further to add on this point, but will quote the last paragraphs in the letter.

"If you would know what our laws are, you must refer to the laws passed in Ohio since 1840."

This has already been answered.

"You said last night, that the property of the wife passed to the husband, even to his sixteenth cousin! Will you correct your error? And oblige A Buckeye."

I should be extremely happy to oblige the gentleman, but having "committed no error there is nothing to correct; and I do not, therefore, see that I can in conscience comply with his request. I am, however, exceedingly thankful for any expression of interest from that quarter. 'There are other laws which might be mentioned, which really give woman an apparent advantage over man; yet, having no relevancy to the subject in the petition, we did not see fit to introduce them. One of these is, that no woman shall be subject to arrest and imprisonment for debt; while no man, that is, no ordinary man, none unless he has a halo of military glory around his brow, is held sacred from civil process of this kind. But this exemption is of very little benefit to woman, since, if the laws were as severe to her as to man, she would seldom risk the penalty. For this there are two very good reasons. One is, that conscious of her inability to discharge obligations of this kind, she has little disposition to run deeply into debt; and the other is, that she has not the credit to do it if she wished! If, however, she does involve herself in this way, the law exempts her from imprisonment. This, perhaps, is offered as a sort of palliation for the disabilities which she suffers in other respects. The only object of the petition is, I believe, that the husband and wife be placed upon a legal and political equality. If the law gives woman an advantage over man, we deprecate it as much as he can. Partiality to either, to the injury of the other, is wrong in principle, and we must therefore oppose it. We do not wish to be placed in the position which 'the husband now occupies. We do not wish that control over his interests, which he may now exercise over the interests of the wife. We -would no sooner intrust this power to woman than to man. We would never place her in authority over her husband.