that the feminine intellect is less vigorous, it must also be allowed that it is more acute; if it is not so strong to strike, it is quicker to perceive. But at all events, it will not be contended that there is such a difference in the intellectual capacity of the sexes as that that alone should be a disqualification from the exercise of the right of suffrage. Still less will it be contended that the female part of creation is less virtuous than the masculine. On the contrary, it will be conceded by every one that morality and good order, religion, charity, and all good works appertain rather more to the feminine than to the masculine race.
The argument that women do not want to vote is no argument at all, because if the right to vote is conferred upon them they can exercise it or not, as they choose. It is not a compulsory exercise of power on their part. But I think that argument is partly disproved by the Convention to which the Senator from Pennsylvania referred yesterday, whose arguments he said were worthy of consideration even in this Chamber. I think they are, and I think it would be very difficult for any one in this Chamber to disprove them. Nor is it a fair statement of the case to say that the man represents the woman in the exercise of suffrage, because it is an assumption on the part of the man; it is an involuntary representation so far as the woman is concerned. Representation implies a certain delegated power, and a certain responsibility on the part of the representative toward the party represented. A representation to which the represented party does not assent is no representation at all, but is adding insult to injury. When the American Colonies complained that they ought not to be taxed unless they were represented in the British Parliament, it would have been rather a singular answer to tell them that they were represented by Lord North, or even by the Earl of Chatham. The gentlemen on the other side of the Chamber who say that the States lately in rebellion are entitled to immediate representation in this Chamber would hardly be satisfied if we should tell them that my friend from Massachusetts represented South Carolina, and my friend from Michigan represented Alabama. They would hardly be satisfied, I think, with that kind of representation.
Nor have we any more right to assume that the women are satisfied with the representation of the men. Where has been the assembly at which this right of representation was conferred? Where was the compact made? What were the conditions? It is wholly an assumption. A woman is a member of a manufacturing corporation; she is a stockholder in a bank; she is a shareholder in a railroad company; she attends all those meetings in person or by proxy, and she votes, and her vote is received. Suppose a woman offering to vote at a meeting of a railroad corporation should be told by one of the men "we represent you, you can not vote," it would be precisely the argument that is now used—that men represent the women in the exercise of the elective franchise. A woman pays a large tax, and the man who drives her coach, the man who waits upon her table, goes to the polls and decides how much of her property shall go to support the public expenses, and what shall be done with it. She has no voice in the matter whatever; she is taxed without representation.
