to, no "contemporaneous construction, however universal it may be, can be allowed to set aside the expressed objects of the makers, as declared in the instrument." The construction which we claim for the 1st section of the XIV. Amendment, is in perfect accord with those expressed objects; and even if there were anything in the original text of the Constitution at variance with the true construction of that section, the amendment must control. Yet we believe that there is nothing in the original text at variance with what we claim to be the true construction of the amendment.
It is claimed by the majority of the committee that the adoption of the XV. Amendment was by necessary implication a declaration that the States had the power to deny the right of suffrage to citizens for any other reasons than those of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. We deny that the fundamental rights of the American citizen can be taken away by "implication." There is no such law for the construction of the Constitution of our country. The law is the reverse—that the fundamental rights of citizens are not to be taken away by implication, and a constitutional provision for the protection of one class can certainly not be used to destroy or impair the same rights in another class. It is too violent a construction of an amendment, which prohibits States from, or the United States from, abridging the right of a citizen to vote by reason of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, to say that by implication it conceded to the States the power to deny that right for any other reason. On that theory the States could confine the right of suffrage to a small minority, and make the State governments aristocratic, overthrowing their republican form. The XV. Article of Amendment to the Constitution clearly recognizes the right to vote, as one of the rights of a citizen of the United States. This is the language:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Here is stated, first, the existence of a right. Second, its nature. Whose right is it? The right of citizens of the United States. What is the right? The right to vote. And this right of citizens of the United States, States are forbidden to abridge. Can there be a more direct recognition of a right? Can that be abridged which does not exist? The denial of the power to abridge the right, recognizes the existence of the right. Is it said that this right exists by virtue of State citizenship, and State laws and Constitutions? Mark the language: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote;" not citizens of States. The right is recognized as existing independent of State citizenship.
But it may be said, if the States had no power to abridge the right of suffrage, why the necessity of prohibiting them? There may not have been a necessity; it may have been done through caution, and because the peculiar condition of the colored citizens at that time rendered it necessary to place their rights beyond doubt or cavil.
It is laid down as a rule of construction by Judge Story that the natural import of a single clause is not to be narrowed so as to exclude implied powers resulting from its character simply because there is another clause