either sex, as such. The other answer that has been made is, that this second section is repealed by the XV. Amendment, which forbids the denial of suffrage in the cases where this section seems to allow it; and it is asked, with apparent confidence, whether a law that is repealed can have any further operation whatever. The fallacy here is, that the operation of this second section, so far as it relates to the present question, is wholly in throwing light upon the meaning of the term "citizen," as used in the first section, and this operation is just as perfect after its repeal as before; precisely as a part of a will that has been revoked by a codicil, may yet be read with the rest of the will if it will throw light upon the meaning of the whole.
It is believed, however, that a valid answer can be made to the objection which is founded upon the second section, and that the view here presented will be ultimately sustained by the legal opinion of the country.
1. It is not a necessary inference that the right to exclude from suffrage is admitted by the second section, for this section will bear a construction that is consistent with the enlarged construction which we give to the first section; and it is a well-settled principle that a construction that favors the extension of liberty is itself to be favored, and one which restricts liberty is not to be adopted, except under a necessity. This second section provides for a penalty, in the reduction of its basis of representation, in every case where a State should deny to any class of citizens the right of suffrage. Now, this is not necessarily a concession of the right, but may be regarded as a punishment of the attempt to exercise the so-called right. The matter was practically so much within the power of the States (and the States in view were the disorganized Southern States), that it would be far easier for Congress to enforce the penalty for denying the right of suffrage than for the President to protect that right. It may be regarded as a case, well known to the law, of cumulative remedies. It is precisely as if, in addition to the express prohibition by the Constitution of the making of war by any State, there had been a provision that if any State should make war upon a foreign State, such State should pay the entire expense in which the General Government should become involved by the war. This clearly would be only a penalty and not a concession of the right, the object being to increase and not to diminish the security of the General Government against any attempt of a State to do the act prohibited.
2. The first section of the XIV. Amendment is entirely senseless and idle, except upon the construction which we claim. The term "citizen" means either "voter" or merely "member of the nation," as distinguished from an alien. Judge Cartter, in his late opinion in the case of Spencer vs. The Board of Registration, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sees this necessity, and that there is no intermediate status, and holds that the term means merely a person clothed with the civil rights of an inhabitant, as distinguished from an alien. Let it be borne in mind, then, that those who deny the construction which we claim, must make the word citizen mean merely "not an alien." Let it also be borne in mind that by the XIII. Amendment, which abol-