that she has the right to be employed as an agent, or attorney, or physician, if she is capable, and to agree to do the duties of her profession. It would almost seem that this question is answered by the following extract from the opinion of this honorable court, as delivered by Mr. Justice Lawrence, in Carpenter vs. Mitchell, 2 Legal News, 44:
It may be said that a married woman can not adequately enjoy her separate property unless she can make contracts in regard to it. This is true, and hence her power to make contracts, so far as may be necessary for the use and enjoyment of her property, must be regarded as resulting by implication from the statute. If she owns houses she must be permitted to contract for their repair or rental. If she owns a farm she must be permitted to bargain for its cultivation, and to dispose of its products. We give these as illustrations of the power of contracting which is fairly implied in the law.
It is true, in this opinion the learned Judge confines his remarks strictly to the contracts of the wife made in relation to her separate property, and not in relation to general trade. This case arose before the passage of the Act of 1869. The right of a married woman to bring a suit in her own name is a necessary incident to the law. (Cole vs. Van Riper, 1 Legal News, 41.)
V. The Trades and Professions open to Women.—The doors of many of our universities and law schools are now open to women upon an equality with men. The Government of the United States has employed women in many of its departments, and appointed many, both single and married, to office. Almost every large city in the Union has its regularly-admitted female physicians. The law schools of the nation have now many women in regular attendance, fitting themselves to perform the duties of the profession. The bar itself is not without its women lawyers, both single and married.
Mrs. Arabella A. Mansfield, wife of Prof. J. M. Mansfield, of Mount Pleasant, Iowa, was admitted to the bar of Iowa, upon the unanimous petition of the attorneys of that place, after a very careful examination, not only of the applicant, but of the statutes regulating the admission of attorneys.
The statute of Iowa provides that "any white male person, twenty-one years of age, who is an inhabitant of this State," and who satisfies the court, "that he possesses the requisite learning, and that he is of good moral character, may, by such court, be licensed to practice in all the courts of the State, upon taking the usual oath of office."
The clause construing statutes is as follows:
Words importing the singular number only, may be extended to several persons or things; and words importing the plural number only may be applied to one person, or thing; and words importing the masculine gender only may be extended to females.
In Mrs. Mansfield's case, the court not only held that she could be admitted, notwithstanding the fact that she was a married woman, under the clause of the statute giving a construction to the masculine noun "male," and pronoun "he"; but that the affirmative declaration, that male persons may be admitted, is not an implied denial of the right to females. We know of no instance in the United States, where a woman, whether married or single, who has complied with the statutes of the State in which she lived and applied for admission, that the proper court has refused to grant her license.
VI. How the Legislature have Regarded your Petitioner.—It has been held, in England, that a wife who does business in her own name, with either the express or implied consent of her husband, should be