Union? Because he is a citizen of the United States, and that is one of the privileges of a citizen. Why may a colored citizen be admitted to the bar? Because he is a citizen, and that is one of the avocations open to every citizen; and no State can abridge his right to pursue it. Certainly no other reason can be given.
Now, let us come to the case of Myra Bradwell. She is a citizen of the United States, and of the State of Illinois, residing therein; she has been judicially ascertained to be of full age, and to possess the requisite character and learning. Indeed, the court below, in their opinion, found in the record, page 9, say: "Of the ample qualifications of the applicant we have no doubt." Still, admission to the bar was denied the petitioner, not upon the ground that she was not a citizen; not for want of age or qualifications; not because the profession of the law is not one of those avocations which are open to every American citizen as matter of right, upon complying with the reasonable regulations prescribed by the Legislature: but upon the sole ground that inconvenience would result from permitting her to enjoy her legal rights in this, to wit, that her clients might have difficulty in enforcing the contracts they might make with her, as their attorney, because of her being a married woman.
Now, with entire respect to that court, it is submitted that this argument ab inconvenienti, which might have been urged with whatever force belongs to it, against adopting the XIV. Amendment in the full scope of its language, is utterly futile to resist its full and proper operation, now that it has been adopted. Concede, for argument, that the XIV. Amendment ought to have read thus:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizens except married women;
yet that exception is not found in the sweeping provision of this amendment. It is provided that citizens may be disfranchised for treason; but it is nowhere provided that a citizen shall be disfranchised for being a married woman. The opinion of the court below puts a limitation upon this unlimited constitutional provision. If this court shall approve this exception, in the very teeth of the unambiguous language of the Constitution, where may we expect judicial legislation to stop? Can this court say that married women have no rights that are to be respected? Can this court say that, when the XIV. Amendment speaks of all persons, etc., and declares them to be citizens, it means all male persons and unmarried females? Or can this court say that, when the XIV. Amendment declares "the privileges of no citizen shall be abridged," it means that the privileges of no male citizen or unmarried female citizen shall be abridged? This would be bold dealing with the constitutional provision. It would be excluding a large proportion of the citizens of the United States from privileges which the Constitution declares shall be the inheritance of every citizen alike.
But it is respectfully submitted that the court below erred in holding that a married woman, admitted to the bar under the XIV. Amendment, would not be liable on contracts, express or implied, between her and her clients. In Wisconsin, when the Legislature passed the act protecting married women in the enjoyment of their separate estate, our court, upon reason-