To be a citizen it is necessary that he should be entitled to the enjoyment of these privileges and immunities, upon the same terms upon which they are conferred upon other citizens; and unless he is so entitled he can not, in the proper sense of the term, be a citizen.
In the case of Scott vs. Sanford (19 How. 404), Chief-Justice Taney says:
The words "people of the United States," and "citizens," are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing; they describe the political body, who according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty and hold the power, and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the sovereign people, and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.
Mr. Justice Daniel, in the same case (p. 476), says:
Upon the principles of etymology alone, the term citizen, as derived from civitas, conveys the idea of connection or identification with the State or Government, and a participation in its functions. But beyond this, there is not, it is believed, to be found in the theories of writers on government, or in any actual experiment heretofore tried, an exposition of the term citizen, which has not been understood as conferring the actual possession and enjoyment, or the perfect right of acquisition and enjoyment of an entire equality of privileges, civil and political.
Similar references might be made to an indefinite extent, but enough has been said to show that the term citizen, in the language of Justice Daniel, conveys the idea "of identification with the State or Government, and a participation in its functions." Beyond question, therefore, the first section of the XIV. Amendment, by placing the citizenship of women upon a par with that of men, and declaring that the "privileges and immunities" of the citizen shall not be abridged, has secured to women, equally with men, the right of suffrage, unless that conclusion is overthrown by some other provision of the Constitution.
It is not necessary for the purposes of this argument to claim that this Amendment prohibits a State from making or enforcing any law whatever, regulating the elective franchise, or prescribing the conditions upon which it may be exercised. But we do claim that in every republic the right of suffrage, in some form and to some extent, is not only one of the privileges of its citizens, but is the first, most obvious and most important of all the privileges they enjoy; that in this respect all citizens are equal, and that the effect of this Amendment is, to prohibit the States from enforcing any law which denies this right to any of its citizens, or which imposes any restrictions upon it, which are inconsistent with a republican form of government. Within this limit, it is unnecessary for us to deny that the States may still regulate and control the exercise of the right.
The only provisions of the Constitution which it can be contended conflict with the construction which has here been put upon the first section of the XIV. Amendment, are the XV. Amendment, and the second section of the XIV. In regard to the XV. Amendment, I shall only say, that if my interpretation of the XIV. is correct, there was still an object to be accomplished and which was accomplished by the XV. The prohibition of any action abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens, contained in the XIV. Amendment, applies only to the States, and leaves the United States Government free to abridge the political privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as such, at its pleasure. By the XV. Amendment both the United States and the State governments are pro-