sponds very nearly with what I have here said. The learned Judge, in one part of his opinion, says:
It is possible that those who framed the article were not themselves aware of the far-reaching character of its terms. They may have had in mind but one particular phase of social and political wrong, which they desired to redress—yet, if the Amendment, as framed and expressed, does, in fact, have a broader meaning, and does extend its protecting shield over those who were never thought of when it was conceived and put in form, and does reach such social evils which were never before prohibited by constitutional amendment, it is to be presumed that the American people, in giving it their imprimatur, understood what they were doing, and meant to decree what has, in fact, been done.... It embraces much more. The "privileges and immunities" secured by the original Constitution were only such as each State gave its own citizens. Each was prohibited from discriminating in favor of its own citizens, and against the citizens of other States. But the XIV. Amendment prohibits any State from abridging the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, whether its own citizens or any others. It not merely requires equality of privileges, but it demands that the privileges and immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged, unimpaired. (1 Abbott's U. S. Rep., 397).
It will doubtless be urged as an objection to my position (that citizenship carries with it the right to vote) that it would, in that case, follow that infants and lunatics, who, as well as adults and persons of sound mind, are citizens, would also have that right. This objection, which appears to have great weight with certain classes of persons, is entirely without force. It takes no note of the familiar fact, that every legislative provision, whether constitutional or statutory, which confers any discretionary power, is always confined in its operation to persons who are compos mentis. It is wholly unnecessary to except idiots and lunatics out of any such statute. They are excluded from the very nature of the case. The contrary supposition would be simply absurd. And, in respect to every such law, infants, during their minority, are in the same class. But are women, who are not infants, ever included in this category? Does any such principle of exclusion apply to them? Not at all. On the contrary, they stand, in this respect, upon the same footing as men, with the sole exception of the right to vote and the right to hold office. In every other respect, whatever rights and powers are conferred upon persons by law may be exercised by women as well as by men. They may transact any kind of business for themselves, or as agents or trustees for others; may be executors and administrators, with the same powers and responsibilities as men; and it ought not to be a matter of surprise or regret that they are now placed, by the XIV. Amendment, in other respects upon a footing of perfect equality.
Although not directly connected with the argument as to the right secured to women by the Constitution, I deem it not improper to allude briefly to some of the popular objections against the propriety of allowing females the privilege of voting. I do this because I know from past experience that these popular objections, having no logical bearing upon the subject, are yet, practically, among the most potent arguments against the interpretation of the XIV. Amendment, which I consider the only one that its language fairly admits of.
It is said that women do not desire to vote. Certainly many women do not but that furnishes no reason for denying the right to those who do desire to vote. Many men decline to vote. Is that a reason for denying the