a citizen of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. If the Legislature of the State of New York should require a higher qualification in a voter for a representative in Congress than is required for a voter for a member of Assembly, this would, I conceive, be a violation of a right belonging to one as a citizen of the United States. That right is in relation to a federal subject or interest, and is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The inability of a State to abridge the right of voting on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, arises from a federal guaranty. Its violation would be the denial of a federal right—that is, a right belonging to the claimant as a citizen of the United States.
This right, however, exists by virtue of the XV. Amendment. If the XV. Amendment had contained the word "sex," the argument of the defendant would have been potent. She would have said, an attempt by a State to deny the right to vote because one is of a particular sex, is expressly prohibited by that Amendment. The Amendment, however, does not contain that word. It is limited to race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Legislature of the State of New York has seen fit to say, that the franchise of voting shall be limited to the male sex. In saying this there is, in my judgment, no violation of the letter or of the spirit of the XIV. or of the XV. Amendment.
This view is assumed in the second section of the XIV. Amendment, which enacts that if the right to vote for Federal officers is denied by any State to any of the male inhabitants of such State, except for crime, the basis of representation of such State shall be reduced in proportion specified. Not only does this section assume that the right of male inhabitants to vote was the especial object of its protection, but it assumes and admits the right of a State, notwithstanding the existence of that clause under which the defendant claims to the contrary, to deny to classes or portions of the male inhabitants the right to vote which is allowed to other male inhabitants. The regulation of the suffrage is thereby conceded to the States as a State's right.
The case of Myra Bradwell, decided at a recent term of the Supreme Court of the United States, sustains both the positions above put forth, viz: First, that the rights referred to in the XIV. Amendment are those belonging to a person as a citizen of the United States and not as a citizen of a State; and second, that a right of the character here involved is not one connected with citizenship of the United States. Mrs. Bradwell made application to be admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the Courts of Illinois. Her application was denied, and upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, it was there held that to give jurisdiction under the XIV. Amendment, the claim must be of a right pertaining to citizenship of the United States, and that the claim made by her did not come within that class of cases. Mr. Justice Bradley and Mr. Justice Field held that a woman was not entitled to a license to practice law. It does not appear that the other Judges passed upon that question. The XIV. Amendment gives no right to a woman to vote, and the voting by Miss Anthony was in violation of the law.