Page:History of Woman Suffrage Volume 2.djvu/727

Mr. Crowley: I submit to the Court that unless the counsel expects to change the version given by the other witnesses, it is not necessary to take up time.

The Court: As a matter of discretion, I don't see how it will be any benefit. It was fully related by the others, and doubtless correctly.

Mr. Crowley: It is not disputed.

The Witness: I would like to say, if I might be allowed by the Court, that the general impression that I swore I was a male citizen, is an erroneous one.

Mr. Van Voorhis: You took the two oaths there, did you? A. Yes, sir.

The Court: You presented yourself as a female, claiming that you had a right to vote? A. I presented myself not as a female at all, sir; I presented myself as a citizen of the United States. I was called to the United States ballot-box by the XIV. Amendment, not as a female, but as a citizen, and I went there.

Miss Anthony's emphatic reply and intimation that, although a condemned criminal for having voted, she still believed in her citizenship as securing that right to her, closed the lips of the Court, and she was summarily dismissed from the witness-box, and the case rested.

Mr. Van Voorhis addressed the Court at some length, submitting that there was no ground whatever to charge these defendants (the Inspectors) with any criminal offense,

1. Because the women who voted were legal voters. 2. Because they were challenged and took the oaths which the statute requires of Electors, and the Inspectors had no right, after such oath, to reject their votes. 3. Because no malice is shown. Whether the women were entitled to have their names registered and to vote, or not, the defendants believed they had such right, and acted in good faith, according to their best judgment, in allowing the registry of their names—and in receiving their votes—and whether they decided right or wrong in point of law, they are not guilty of any criminal offense.

These points were amplified by the counsel at some length, who closed by saying, "The defendants should be discharged by the Court." Mr. Crowley then rose to make his argument, when the Court said:

The Court: I don't think it is necessary for you to spend time in argument, Mr. Crowley. I think upon the last authority cited by the counsel there is no defense in this case. It is entirely clear that where there is a distinct judicial act, the party performing the judicial act is not responsible, civilly or criminally, unless corruption is proven, and in many cases when corruption is not proven. But where the act is not judicial in its character—where there is no discretion—then there is no legal protection. That is the law as laid down in the authority last quoted, and the authority quoted by Judge Selden in his opinion. It is undoubtedly good law. They hold expressly in