In United States vs. Porter (1 Bald., 108), the doctrine was stated more guardedly, as follows:
In repeating what was said on a former occasion to another jury, that you have the power to decide on the law as well as the facts of this case, and are not bound to find according to our opinion of the law, we feel ourselves constrained to make some explanations not then deemed necessary, but now called for from the course of the defense.
You may find a general verdict of guilty or not guilty as you think proper, or may find the facts specially, and leave the guilt or innocence of the prisoner to the judgment of the court. If your verdict acquits the prisoner, we can not grant a new trial, however much we may differ with you as to the law which governs the case; and, in this respect, a jury are the judges of law if they choose to become so.
In Farmer's trial before the Supreme Court of the State of New Hampshire in 1821, the Chief-Justice, speaking for the whole court, told the jury that they were the judges both of the law and the fact; that
It was the duty of the court to give them proper instructions and to aid them in forming a correct opinion as to the law applicable to the case. But if, contrary to his intentions, any expression should escape him which might seem to indicate any opinion as to the facts, they must disregard it; their verdict ought to be according to their own opinion as to the prisoner's guilt or innocence. (See Farmer's Trial, p. 68.)
In the trial of William S. Smith for misdemeanor, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the State of New York, in July, 1806, the jury were instructed as follows:
You have heard much said upon the right of a jury to judge of the law as well as the fact. Be assured that on this occasion there is not the least desire to abridge those rights. I am an advocate for the independence of the jury. It is the basis of civil liberty; and in this country, I trust, will ever be a sacred bulwark against oppression and encroachment upon political freedom. The law is now settled that this right appertains to a jury in all criminal cases.
On the trial of John Hodges for high treason, before the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, in 1815, the Court charged the jury as follows:
The court said they were bound to declare the law whenever they were called upon, in civil or criminal cases. In the latter, however, it was also their duty to inform the jury that they were not obliged to take their direction as to the law. (Hodge's Trial, p. 20.)
The elementary writers declare the same principle. Blackstone, 4 Comm., 361, says:
