that, in cases where the jury acquit the defendant, there is no power to reverse or even to review the finding of the jury. And this opinion holds that the defendant, in all criminal cases, is entitled to address the jury upon the questions of law as well as of fact involved in the case. To maintain that the defendant has the right to address the jury upon matters which the jury have no right to determine, and yet that the jury possess the power—the ultimate and final power—to decide matters of law, and are nevertheless under moral obligation never to exercise the power, are palpable inconsistencies.
The Supreme Court of Vermont in State vs. Croteau, 23 Ver., 14, in a very able opinion, review these two cases and other subsequent decisions which follow their doctrine, and, after an able and critical examination of all the English and American cases, repudiate this new doctrine, and declare that in criminal prosecutions it is the ancient, common-law right of the jury in favor of the prisoner to determine the whole matter in issue—the law as well as the fact.
There are some American cases holding a contrary doctrine, but the current of American as well as of English authorities is overwhelmingly in favor of the proposition that juries in criminal causes are judges of the law as well as of the facts.[1]
In late years there has been considerable discussion, and some contrariety of judicial opinion, in regard to the moral right of juries to find a general verdict of not guilty against the instructions of the court on matters of law. This subject, however, need not be further discussed, because it is believed that no reported case can be found denying to juries the power of determining the law as well as the fact in all criminal cases. The utmost extent to which any case goes is, that the jury, in deciding upon the law, are morally bound to adopt the opinion expressed by the court; but every case admits their power to do otherwise if they see fit. But admitting the existence of the distinction between the legal power and the moral right of juries, still the decision of the court on the trial of Miss Anthony was erroneous, because the court did not instruct the jury in regard to the law, and then leave the jury to perform their duty in the premises. On the contrary, the court took the case from the jury altogether and directed their verdict; thus denying to the jury not only the moral right, but even the power of rendering a verdict of not guilty; and refused the request of counsel to have the jury polled in regard to their verdict. No precedent has been shown for this proceeding, and it is believed none exists. It is altogether a departure from, and a most dangerous innovation upon, the well-settled method of jury-trial in criminal cases. Such a doctrine renders the trial by jury a farce. The memorialist had no jury-trial within the meaning of the Constitution, and her conviction was therefore erroneous.
But it may be said that the ruling of the court was correct in point of
- ↑ To the same effect see former decisions in Massachusetts: Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass., 25; Com. vs. Knapp, 10 Pic., 496; and see also State vs. Snow, 18 Maine, 346; Doss vs. Com., 1 Grattan, 557; Peo. vs. McFall, 1 Wheeler Crim. Rec., 108, note; Holder vs. The State, 5 Georgia, 443; State vs. Allen, 1 McCord, 525; State vs. Jones, 5 Alabama, 666; Armstrong vs. The State, 4 Blackford, 247; Patterson vs. The State, 2 English, 59.
