security for freedom if this be denied. To use the language of Mr. Madison, such a course "violates the vital principle of free government, that those who are to be bound by laws, ought to have a voice in making them." (Madison Papers, vol. 3—appendix, p. 12.)
It is sometimes said this is one of the "reserved rights" of the States. But this can not be, for the simple reason that, as to the "privileges and immunities" of federal citizenship, they had no existence prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution; how then could they be reserved?
As Mr. Justice Story says: "The States can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the existence of the National Government, which the Constitution does not delegate to them.... No State can say that it has reserved what it never possessed." (Commentaries, §§ 624-627.)
We say, then, that the States may regulate, but they have no right to prohibit the franchise to citizens of the United States. They may prescribe the qualifications of the electors. They may require that they shall be of a certain age, be of sane mind, be free from crime, etc., because these are conditions for the good of the whole, and to which all citizens, sooner or later, may attain. But to single out a class of citizens and say to them, "Notwithstanding you possess all these qualifications, you shall never vote, or take part in your government," what is it but a bill of attainder?
To show that the mere regulation of this matter of suffrage was left to the States for the purpose we have indicated, and not to their absolute and ultimate control, we will now quote the language of one of the framers of the Constitution, to whom, indeed, has been applied the epithet of "Father of the Constitution"—James Madison; and this, too, in reply to questions by Mr. Monroe, who sought an explanation on these very points. We quote from the debates in the Virginia convention upon the adoption of the Federal Constitution:
Mr. Madison: Mr. Chairman, the reason of the exception was, that if Congress could fix the place of choosing the Senators, it might compel the State Legislatures to elect them in a different place from that of their usual sessions, which would produce some inconvenience, and was not necessary for the object of regulating the elections. But it was necessary to give the General Government a control over the time and manner of choosing the Senators, to prevent its own dissolution.
With respect to the other point, it was thought that the regulation of time, place, and manner of electing the Representatives should be uniform throughout the continent. Some States might regulate the elections on the principles of equality, and others might regulate them otherwise. This diversity would be obviously unjust. Elections are regulated now unequally in some States, particularly South Carolina, with respect to Charleston, which is represented by thirty members.
Should the people of any State by any means be deprived of the right of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the General Government.
It was found impossible to fix the time, place, and manner of the election of Representatives in the Constitution. It was found necessary to leave the regulation of these, in the first place, to the State Government, as being best acquainted with the situation of the people, subject to the control of the General Government, in order to enable it to produce