"The difference," says Judge Cooley (Story on Constitution, section 1937), "is in a high degree important." And while it may be true that the voter himself rarely, if ever, thinks of any difference between his vote for State and for Federal officers, yet, in law, there is a wide distinction.
In the one case he exercises the franchise under one jurisdiction or sovereignty, and in the other under a totally different one. In voting for Federal officers he exercises the freeman's right to take part in the government of his own creation, and he does this in contemplation of law, in his character or capacity of a citizen of the United States, and his right so to vote legally depends upon such status or character. Clearly, then, the right of a citizen of the United States to vote for Federal officers can only be exercised under the authority or sovereignty of the United States, not under some other authority or sovereignty, and consequently the citizen of the United States could not justly have been deprived of such right by the State, even before the adoption of the XIV. Amendment. But whatever doubt there may have been as to this, we hold that the adoption of the XIV. Amendment put an end to it and placed the matter beyond controversy. The history of that Amendment shows that it was designed as a limitation on the powers of the States, in many important particulars, and its language is clear and unmistakable. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." Of course all the citizens of the United States are by this protected in the enjoyment of their privileges and immunities. Among the privileges, that of voting is the highest and greatest. To an American citizen there can be none greater or more highly to be prized; and the preservation of this privilege to the citizens of the United States respectively is, by this Amendment, placed under the immediate supervision and care of the Government of the United States, who are thus charged with its fulfillment and guaranty.
By ratifying this Amendment the several States have relinquished and quit-claimed, so to speak, to the United States, all claim or right, on their part, to "make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." The State of Missouri, therefore, is estopped from longer claiming this right to limit the franchise to "males," as a State prerogative; and the Supreme Court of Missouri should have so declared, and its failure to do so is error; because, by retaining that word in the State Constitution and laws, not this plaintiff only, but large numbers of other citizens of the United States are "abridged" in the exercise of their "privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States," by being deprived of their right or privilege to vote for United States officers, as claimed by the plaintiff in her petition. Not only this, but we say further, that the ratification of this amendment was, in intendment of law, a solemn agreement, on the part of the States, that all existing legislation inconsistent therewith should be repealed, or considered as repealed, and that none of like character should take place in the future. The State of Missouri has acted upon this idea in part, and its subsequent legislation, on the subject of the ballot, has been as follows: The ratification of the XV. Amendment (which we do not consider as having any direct bearing on the point now being considered, inasmuch as this Amend-
