eges; and especially of the right of the citizen to participate in his or her government.
3d. The denial or abridgment of this privilege, if it exist at all, must be sought only in the fundamental charter of government—the Constitution of the United States. If not found there, no inferior power or jurisdiction can legally claim the right to exercise it.
4th. But the Constitution of the United States, so far from recognizing or permitting any denial or abridgment of the privileges of its citizens, expressly declares that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
5th. It follows that the provisions of the Missouri Constitution and registry law before recited, are in conflict with and must yield to the paramount authority of the Constitution of the United States,
A few words more and we have done. The plaintiff has sought, by this action, for the establishment of a great principle of fundamental right, applicable not only to herself, but to the class to which she belongs; for the principles here laid down (as in the Dred Scott case) extend far beyond the limits of the particular suit, and embrace the rights of millions of others, who are thus represented through her. She has a right, therefore, to be heard for her cause; and in making this plea, she seeks only to give expression to those principles upon which, as upon a rock, our Government is founded.
It is impossible that that can be a Republican government in which one half the citizens thereof are forever disfranchised. A citizen disfranchised is a citizen attainted; and this, too, in face of the fact, that you look in vain in the great charter of government, the Constitution of the United States, for any warrant or authority for such discrimination. To that instrument she appeals for protection.
Supreme Court of the United States. No. 182.—October Term, 1874. Virginia L. Minor and Francis Minor, her husband, Plaintiffs in Error, vs. Reese Happersett. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.
Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court. (March 29, 1875.)
The question is presented in this case, whether, since the adoption of the XIV. Amendment, a woman, who is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, is a voter in that State, notwithstanding the provision of the Constitution and laws of the State, which confine the right of suffrage to men alone. We might perhaps decide the case upon other grounds, but this question is fairly made. From the opinion, we find that it was the only one decided in the court below, and it is the only one which has been argued here. The case was undoubtedly brought to this court for the sole purpose of having that question decided by us, and, in view of the evident propriety there is of having it settled, so far as it can be by such a decision, we have concluded to waive all other considerations and proceed at once to its determination.
It is contended that the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri, which confine the right of suffrage and registration
