power to individuals, and thus the question is absolutely settled for the State. It is true, the State does not carry out completely its own theory, but this was its theory, and what it did was wholly in this direction and away from the family theory. We go to the constitution of the State to settle this question, just as we would to settle the question whether the governor's term is one year or two, or whether the judges hold office for a term of years'or for life. While considering whether either of these provisions ought to be adopted, we are dealing with a matter proper for opinions and argument, but when the provisions have been adopted, the whole question becomes one of fact, and we look only to the constitution to determine it, and treat it as a matter not for discussion but for absolute ascertainment.
When one is advocating the theory that the family should be the political basis of the State, he is simply saying that the constitution ought to be amended and the right of voting taken away from individuals and given to families. But it is idle to urge this. Such a measure would not get even a respectable minority of votes. It is decisive on this point that not a single representative government, so far as the writer knows, has adopted the theory that the family and not the individual should vote. A law peculiar to Russia gives its villages, in the management of their local matters, the right of voting by families—a perfect illustration, on a very small scale, of the family as the political basis of a State. But here woman suffrage is admitted as a necessary result; and where there is no man to represent the family, or he is unable to attend, the woman of the house casts the vote.
The advocates of woman suffrage have no interest whatever in this question, as it is idle to suppose that it can become a practical one. The writer has taken what trouble he has in the matter solely in the interest of correct thinking.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
new york
by hamilton wilcox.
I. Legislature Omnipotent.—-Unlike the Federal constitution, the State constitution does not reserve all powers not expressly delegated. It is held by the authorities that in the absence of positive restriction the legislature is omnipotent.
"In a judicial sense, their authority is absolute and unlimited, except by the express restrictions of the fundamental law" (Court of Appeals, 1863, Bank of Chenango vs. Brown, 26 N. Y., 467; S. P., Cathcart vs. Fire Department of New York, Id., 529; Supreme Court, 1864, Clark vs. Miller, 42 Barb., 255; Luke vs. City of Brooklyn, 43 Id., 54).
"Only on the ground of express constitutional provisions limiting legislative power, can courts declare void any legislative enactment" (Court of Error. 1838, Cochran vs. Van Surlay, 29 Wend., 365; Newell vs. People, 7 N. Y. [3 Seld.], 9, 109).
"Before proceeding to amend, by judicial sentence, what has been enacted by the law-making power, it should clearly appear that the act cannot be supported by any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption "(Court of Appeals, 1858, People vs. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y., 235; affi'g, 27 Barb., 575).
II.Powers Undefined.—The constitution forbids the legislature to do certain things. Otherwise it does not define or limit the legislature's powers (Art. 3, 88 3. 18, 19, 24).
III. No Prohibition.—No constitution of New York has ever forbidden the