attention called to the fact that in the various States the women are now admitted by special legislation to the bar. I do not think there is anything in the law, properly considered, that would debar a woman from coming into this profession. I think the Supreme Court should not have required further legislation, but it seems to have done so, and that makes the necessity for the amendment which I have now offered.
The chairman of the committee in reporting this bill back from the Judiciary Committee said that the bill as it passed the House of Representatives gave privileges to women which men did not enjoy; that is to say, the Supreme Court can by a change of rule require further qualification of men, whereas in regard to women, if this provision were put into the statute, the Supreme Court could not rule them out even though it may be necessary in its judgment to get a higher standard of qualifications than its present rules prescribe. Although I observe that my time is up, I ask indulgence for a moment or two longer. As this is a question of some interest and women cannot appear here to speak for themselves, I hope I may be allowed to speak for them a moment. Now, there is something in the objection stated by the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary—that is to say, the bill would take the rule of the Supreme Court and put it in the statute and apply it to women, thereby conferring exceptional privileges; but that is not my intention at all, and therefore I have proposed that women shall not be excluded from practicing law, if they are otherwise qualified, on account of sex, and that is the provision which I want to send back to the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. Garland: I wish to ask one question of the senator from California. Suppose the court should exclude women, but not on account of sex, then what is their remedy?
Mr. Sargent: I do not see any pretense that the court could exclude them on except on account of sex.
Mr. Garland: If I recollect the rule of the Supreme Court in regard to the admission of practitioners (and I had to appear there twice to present my claim before I could carry on my profession in that court), I do not think any legislation is necessary to aid them by giving them any more access to that court than they have at present under the rules of the Supreme Court.
Mr. Sargent: I believe if the laws now existing were properly construed (of course I speak with all deference to the Supreme Court, but I express the opinion) they would be admitted, but unfortunately the court does not take that view of it, and it will wait for legislation. I purpose that the legislation shall follow. If there is anything in principle why this privilege should not be granted to women who are otherwise qualified, then let the bill be defeated on that ground; but I say there is no difference in principle whatever, not the slightest. There is no reason because a citizen of the United States is a woman that she should be deprived of her rights as a citizen, and these are rights of a citizen. She has the same right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and employment, commensurate with her capacities, as a man has; and,