changes are made it is to be presumed that the legislature is satisfied with it in its present form. And where some changes are made in a particular statute, and other parts of it are left unchanged, there is the more reason for the inference from this evidence that the matter of changing the statute was especially considered, that the parts unchanged express the legislative will of to-day, rather than that of perhaps a hundred years ago, when it was originally enacted.
But this statute, in the revision of 1875, is placed immediately after another with regard to the appointment of commissioners of the Superior Court, the necessary construction of which, we think, throws light upon the construction of the statute in question. That act was passed in 1855, after women had begun, with general acceptance, to occupy a greatly enlarged field of industry and some professional and even public positions; and it has been held by the Superior Court, very properly we think, as applying to women, a woman having three years ago been appointed commissioner under it. Its language is as follows: "The Superior Court in any county may appoint any number of persons in such county to be commissioners of the Superior Court, who, when sworn, may sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and the acknowledgement of deeds, and shall hold office for two years from their appointment." Here the very language is used which is used in the statute with regard to attorneys. In one it is, "any number of persons," in the other, "such persons as are qualified." These two statutes are placed in immediate juxtaposition in the revision of 1875 and deal with kindred subjects, and it is reasonable to presume that the revisers and legislature intended both to receive the same construction. It would seem strange to any common-sense observer that an entirely different meaning should be given to the same word in the two statutes, especially when in giving the narrower meaning to the word in the statute with regard to attorneys, we are compelled to give it a different meaning from that which the same word requires in the next line of the same statute.
We are not to forget that all statutes are to be construed, as far as possible, in favor of equality of rights. All restrictions upon human liberty, all claims for special privileges, are to be regarded as having the presumption of law against them, and as standing upon their defense, and can be sustained if at all by valid legislation, only by the clear expression or clear implication of the law.
We have some noteworthy illustrations of the recognition of women as eligible or appointable to office under statutes of which the language is merely general. Thus, women are appointed in all parts of the country as postmasters. The act of congress of 1825 was the first one conferring upon the postmaster-general the power of appointing postmasters, and it has remained essentially unchanged to the present time. The language of the act is, that "the postmaster-general shall establish post-offices and appoint postmasters." Here women are not included, except in the general term "postmasters," a term which seems to imply a male person; and no legislation from 1825 down to the present time authorizes the appointment of women, nor is there any reference in terms to women until the revision of 1874, which recognizes the fact that women had already been appointed, in providing that "the bond of any married woman who may be appointed postmaster shall be binding on her and her sureties." Some of the higher grades of postmasters are appointed by the president, subject to confirmation by the Senate, and such appointments and confirmations have repeatedly been made. The same may be said of pension agents. The acts of congress on the subject have simply authorized "the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint all pension agents, who shall hold their offices for the term of four years, and shall give bond," etc. At the last session of congress a married woman in Chicago was appointed for a third term pension agent for the State of Illinois, and the public papers stated that there was not a single vote against her confirmation in the Senate. Public opinion is everywhere approving of such appointments. They promote the public interest, which is benefitted by every legitimate use of individual ability, while mere justice, which is of interest to all, requires that all have the
