Page:History of Woman Suffrage Volume 3.djvu/478

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Opinion of the Attorney-General.
435

can be granted to any class of persons not named in the constitution. I reply:

First—it has been decided so often by the judicial tribunals of the various States of the Union, and by the Supreme Court of the United States, that suffrage is not a natural inherent right, but one governed by the lawmaking power and regulated by questions of availability and expediency, instead of absolute, inalienable right (1, 3), that the question is no longer open for discussion, either by the judicial forum or legislative assemblies (Burnham vs. Laning, I Legal Gazette Rep., git, Supreme Court Penn.; Minor vs. Happersett, 21 Wallace, 162; Day vs. Jones, 31 California, 261; Anderson vs. Baker, 23 Maryland, 531; Abbott vs. Bayley, 6 Pickering, 92; 2 Dallas, 471-2; In re Susan B. Anthony, 11 Blatchford, 200). At the common law women had no right to vote and no political status (2, 4) (Maine's Ancient Law, 140; Cooley's Const. Lim., 599; Blackstone's Comm., 171).

Second—Therefore the constitution of the State of New York, providing that every male citizen of the age of 21 years who shall have certain other qualifications, may vote, the determination of the organic law specifying who shall have the privilege of voting, excludes all other classes (5), such as women, persons under 21 years of age and aliens. The argument that, because women are not expressly prohibited, they may vote, fails to give the slightest force to the term "male" in the constitution; and by the same force of reasoning, the expression of the term "citizen" and the statement of the age of 21 years would not necessarily exclude aliens and those under 21 years of age from voting (6). Therefore, assuming that -our organic law was properly adopted without the participation of women either in making or adopting it (7), that organic law controls.

Third—It follows, therefore, as a logical consequence that the proposed reform cannot be accomplished except by an amendment of the constitution ratified by two successive legislatures and the people, or by a constitutional convention, whose work shall be sanctioned by a vote of the people.

Leslie W. Russell, Attorney-General.[1]

Weak as was this document, and untenable as were its assertions, it had great weight with many of the members of the legislature coming as the opinion did from the attorney-general of the State. The friends of the bill resolved to call for the vote when the bill should be reached, and on May 16, the women were present in large numbers, listening with intense interest to the brief speeches of the members for and against, and watching and counting the vote as the roll-call proceeded, which resulted in 54 ayes and §9 noes, lacking three votes of a majority of those present and only eleven of the requisite number, sixty-five. In view of the official opinion against its constitutionality amounting to a legal decision, this was a most gratifying vote.[2]

  1. Mr. Hamilton Wilcox at once prepared an able paper, refuting the attorney-general's assertion. It was widely circulated throughout the State.
  2. When the vote was announced, the ladies sent the pages with bouquets to the leading speakers in behalf of the bill, and button-hole sprigs to the fifty-four who voted aye.