356 BUSSY TO 1751. chap, defence of that city. But, even were he to succeed in viii . . ^ ' m A persuading them to do so, it seemed as though Dupleix 1751. had nothing to fear from their efforts, for Lawrence, their ancient leader, was absent, the genius of Clive had not then been discovered, and Dupleix knew and rated at its real value the capacity of such men as Gingens and Cope. Could he foretell that out of that dispirited colony of baffled enemies, who, not even venturing to remove their seat of Government to Madras, remained cooped up in Fort St. David, idle spectators of his daring enterprise, there would arise one of the most consummate leaders of the age] Ought he to have acted as though such a contingency were possible 1 Yes, undoubtedly, if we are to judge men by the highest standard, if we are to make no allowances for human impulses and human passions. we are bound to declare that he ought so to have acted. Before sending Bussy to the Dakhan, he ought at least, as a measure of wise precaution, to have made sure of Trichinapalli, to have crushed the last rival of Chanda Sahib. Had he done that — had he thus deprived the English of all pretext to interfere, and had he then been able to send Bussy to Aurangabad — the Karnatik would have been his, the Dakhan would have become his, and before long, all India south of the Vindhya range would have acknowledged the supremacy of the French. Still, though it was a great, as it turned out, indeed, a fatal fault, who will assert, that in the presence of so great a temptation, and in the prospect, seemingly certain, of repose in the Karnatik — for, it will be remembered, Muhammad Ali had lulled the suspicions of Dupleix by promises to surrender — who, we say, will assert that such a fault ought to be imputed as a fatal mistake to the illustrious Frenchman ? We must recollect that the moment was so opportune — MuzafFar Jang going to take possession of his government, the
