NEGOTIATIONS FOK PEACE. 365 he had chosen, and in so dealing with it as to convince chap. its leader that it was for his interest to ally himself with , i _ him, rather than with his competitor for the rule of the 1751. Dakhan. Thus, after the last battle, the Peshwa began to consider whether it was necessary or advisable to continue the contest further. Any nearer approach to Puna or Satara might, he felt, give to the partisans of Tara Bai a weight sufficient to endanger his own influ- ence and power. He accordingly opened negotiations with Salabat Jang, and although these were protracted, owing to some difficulties raised by that nobleman, an armistice was concluded at the beginning of the year. Salabat Jang was anxious to come to an under- standing with the Marathas, the more so as his own army, badly organised and worse officered, was almost in a state of mutiny. The men had some reason for their discontent, for their pay was considerably in arrear, and the officers, especially the superior officers, for the most part uneducated in their profession, were jealous of the credit gained by the French. They con- stantly insinuated that Bussy had ulterior objects in view which a prolongation of hostilities alone could procure for him. But there was another reason not less potent. Ghazi-ud-din was approaching Aurangabad, and it was an object with Salabat to deal with him whilst yet the recollection of the recent campaign should be fresh in the minds of the Marathas. The advice given by Bussy, under these circumstances, was worthy of his reputation for tact and skill. The French leader had not been unobservant of the signs of discontent. But it had seemed to him even less desirable for French interests than for those of the Subadar, to march upon Puna. He resolved, therefore, to act in such a manner as at the same time to allay those discontents, and to further the interests of his countrymen. He accord- ingly supported the propositions in favour of peace, both openly and in private, thus alike disarming his
