SIEGE OF BAZA. 53 of his forces, before the enemy was aware of his chapteu XIV. intention. After regaining his former position, a council of Despondcu- war was summoned to deliberate on the course next ^p^^^^f to be pursued. The chiefs were filled with despon- dency, as they revolved the difficulties of their sit- uation. They almost despaired of enforcing the blockade of a place, whose peculiar situation gave it such advantages. Even could this be effected, the camp would be exposed, they argued, to the assaults of a desperate garrison on the one hand, and of the populous city of Guadix, hardly twenty miles distant, on the other ; while the good faith of Granada could scarcely be expected to outlive a single reverse of fortune ; so that, instead of besieg- ing, they might be more properly regarded as them- selves besieged. In addition to these evils, the winter frequently set in with much rigor in this quar- ter ; and the torrents, descending from the moun- tains, and mingling with the waters of the valley, might overwhelm the camp with an inundation, which, if it did not sweep it away at once, would expose it to the perils of famine by cutting off all external communication. Under these gloomy im- pressions, many of the council urged Ferdinand to break up his position at once, and postpone all op- erations on Baza, until the reduction of the sur- rounding country should make it comparatively easy. Even the marquis of Cadiz gave in to this opinion ; and Gutierre de Cardenas, commander of Leon, a cavalier deservedly high in the confidence of the king, was almost the only person of consideration
