Page:History of the Thirty Years' War - Gindely - Volume 1.djvu/127

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THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR
91

in the interest of the Palsgrave’s policy, and determined that even the Bohemians should be kept in ignorance of the real source of this aid, and that they should be left to ascribe it to the Elector. In the beginning of September, therefore, Mansfeld advanced-into Bohemia and began the siege of Pilsen, one of the few cities which remained true to the Emperor. Ruppa, and a few others who were admitted to the secrets of the foreign policy, and who still thought themselves indebted to the Palsgrave alone for this aid, were now in full sympathy with him.

V.

The enlisting and equipment of an imperial army received more attention after the seizure of Khlesl, and yet not so much as the urgency of the case demanded. Ferdinand, whose interest lay in the raising of as numerous an army as possible, was still blamably indolent. Not to mention the little he knew in regard to military affairs, he should at least have taken care that the resources at hand should have been more economically used than they were. Count Buquoi was called from the Spanish service and invested with the chief command and Count Dampierre and Baron von Khuen associated with him. The arming and equipment were based upon the enrollment of 9,600 infantry and 3,200 cavalry of German troops—that is, drilled after the German method—besides which were enrolled also 300 Hungarian foot and 1,100 hussars, so that they calculated upon 14,000 men. They had, instead of this number, at the end of July, but 12,000 ready, and still determined no longer to delay the attack. Dampierre, to whom was assigned one-half of the troops, passed, in the beginning of August, from the side of the Duchy of Aus-