the peace plan and the means for its realization: The Bohemians must first lay down their arms, because they had first resorted to arms; they might, however, demand in return that, in case their religious liberties should in the future be invaded, they might repel the attack with force. For such an event the Moravians and Silesians offered themselves as security for a common defence against all further violation. It is clear that this proposition, with a little further explanation and an assurance that no one should be punished for the past, would have furnished an acceptable basis for adjustment. The Bohemian party of action would, however, have no more to do with negotiations looking towards adjustment, as they were on the point of entering into further engagements with the Palsgrave; and so Ruppa answered that the basis of negotiation was not to be sought in their disarming, but solely in the withdrawal of the imperial troops. So the Bohemians inverted the spear; while, on the side of the Emperor, it was demanded of them that they begin by disarming, they demanded of their enemies the surrender of the posts they had garrisoned and the evacuation of the land.
In the following days the negotiations were limited to private interviews, in which Z̃erotín and his associates became satisfied that their labors for peace were useless. Nevertheless the Directors delayed their definitive answer to the proposals of the Moravian deputation, because they were just at this time in expectation of decisive intelligence from Breslau. On the 12th of September the Estates had assembled in Breslau in order to act upon the recent Bohemian application for aid in the war. The assembly did not venture to grant the application, but determined to summon a Prince’s day—for this is the name given to the Silesian Diet—to which the decision
