has infected another part of the army, fallen their want of discipline, and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government, have produced a like conduct but too common to the whole, and an entire disregard of that order and subordination necessary to the well-doing of an army, and which had been inculcated before, as well as the nature of our military establishment would admit of,—our condition becomes still more alarming; and, with the deepest concern, I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops."
Howe, not unnaturally, supposing that the defeat of the Americans on Long Island would make a profound impression, dispatched General Sullivan, who had been taken prisoner, to Philadelphia, to offer to Congress a renewal of overtures for peace. He expressed a desire to meet some members of that body, simply as private gentlemen, since he was unable to recognize their official position. Congress after considerable debate, concluded to send a committee to wait upon the Howes, upon whom the British commanders might look, in whatever light they thought fit. Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge, were deputed to Staten Island, "to receive the communications of Lord Howe." The conference, held on the 11th of September, resulted as might have been expected. The Howes had no authority, except to receive submission to the crown; the delegates from Congress neither would nor could listen to any terms short of the acknowledgment of the independence of the United States.
Negotiations having failed, there was of necessity renewed preparations for hostilities. The position of affairs was such, that no one, perhaps, except Washington, could have resolved to persevere in the face of the difficulties that beset his path on every side. The character of the struggle, he had the sagacity to see, must be tedious, desultory, and painful, redeemed by few of those brilliant exploits requisite to dazzle the public mind and sustain the enthusiasm of his country. With so ill-compacted a force, it must be long ere he could hope to face the enemy in a pitched battle with any chance of success; all he could expect was to impede his march, cut off his supplies, and harass his progress; forced to retreat from prudential motives, when his natural temper would have led him to solicit the combat; blamed for inevitable defeats, and looked to for impossible victories. Until the check on Long Island, the Americans had flattered themselves that success would constantly favor their arms. From excessive confidence they now fell into unreasoning dejection. At first, they supposed courage without discipline could do all; now they thought that it could do nothing. Thus disheartened, the militia abandoned their colors by hundreds, and even entire regiments left for their homes.
Howe having made his approaches to New York, it became an object of the first consequence to Washington, to ascertain, if possible, the plans of the enemy, in order to counteract them by the proper movements on his side. Accordingly he applied to the brave Colo-
