Page:History of the United States of America, Spencer, v1.djvu/527

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
Ch. III.]
THE VICTORY AT BENNINGTON.
495

vious disposition of. his little force was most faithfully executed. He expresses his particular obligations to Colonels Warner and Herrick, "whose superior skill was of great service to him." Indeed the battle was planned and fought with a degree of military talent and science, which would have done no discredit to any service in Europe. A higher degree of discipline might have enabled the general to check the eagerness of his men to possess themselves of the spoils of victory; but his ability, even in that moment of dispersion and under the flush of success, to meet and conquer a hostile reinforcement, evinces a judgment and resource, not often equalled in partisan warfare.

In fact, it would be the height of injustice not to recognize, in this battle, the marks of the master mind of the loader, which makes good officers and good soldiers out of any materials, and infuses its own spirit into all that surround it. This brilliant exploit was the work of Stark, from its inception to its achievement. His popular name called the militia together. His resolute will obtained him a separate commission,—at the expense, it is true, of a wise political principle,—but on the present occasion, with the happiest effect. His firmness prevented him from being overruled by the influence of General Lincoln, which would have led him, with his troops, across the Hudson. How few are the men, ho in such a crisis would not merely not have sought, but actually have repudiated, a junction with the main army! How few, who would not only have desired, but actually insisted on taking the responsibility of separate action! Having chosen the burden of acting alone, he acquitted himself in the discharge of his duty, with the spirit and vigor of a man, conscious of ability proportioned to the crisis. He advanced against the enemy with promptitude; sent forward a small force to reconnoitre and measure his strength; chose his ground deliberately and with skill planned and fought the battle with gallantry and success.

The consequences of this victory were of great moment. It roused the people, and nerved them to the contest with the enemy; and it also justified the sagacity of Washington, whose words we have quoted on a previous page. Burgoyne's plans were wholly deranged, and instead of relying upon lateral excursions, to keep the population in alarm, and obtain supplies, he was compelled to procure necessaries as best he might, and the militia flocked to the standard of Gates. His rear was exposed, and Stark, acting on his line of policy, prepared to place himself so that Burgoyne might be hemmed in, and be, as soon after he was, unable to advance or retreat.

The defeat at Bennington was, however, not the only misfortune which now fell upon the British arms. We have noted, on a previous page, that Burgoyne had detached Colonel St. Leger with a body of regular troops, Canadians, loyalists, and Indians, by the way of Oswego, to make a diversion on the upper part of the Mohawk River, and afterwards join him on his way to Albany. On the 2d of August, St. Leger approached Fort Stanwix, or Schuyler, a log fortification, situated on