with which they would view a continuance of the war. This envoy, however, could not at first proceed further than Tabreez, in consequence of the vicinity of a Russian force to that city. The Governor-General of the Caucasus had been reinforced by the arrival of ten thousand men at Tiflis, while the division of Astrakan came up to Kooba and Derbend, and compelled the Shah's troops in that direction to retire. It seems then to have occurred to General Yermeloff to make immediate use of the additional force of which he was now master, and accordingly two Russian divisions moved into the enemy's country in the heart of winter. One of these bodies of men, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, crossed the Araxes at a point from which it might have marched either on Ardabeel or on Tabreez. Both of these cities were undefended, the Persian troops having been dismissed to their homes for the winter.
Notwithstanding this circumstance, it would have been an act of rashness on the part of the Russian officer who commanded the invaders to have attacked Tabreez with so slender a force as that which he had under his orders, but it was open to him to march upon the city of Ardabeel. Indeed it is difficult to conceive what object other than the hope of capturing this city could have induced the Russian military authorities to expose their troops to the dangers and privations of a winter campaign in a country so trying as that bordering on the river Araxes. The possession of Ardabeel by the Russians would have been a standing threat both to Tabreez and to Tehran, whilst from that commanding position the Russian leaders would have exercised a paramount influence over the warlike tribes of the vast plains
