Page:ISC-China.pdf/101

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On the 'Offensive'
  1. push to protect the UK's domestic economic security, HMG acknowledges that China's economic might cannot be ignored.[1]
  2. This has an impact when planning action. For example, exposure of intelligence work may damage bilateral relations to the extent that UK trade and investment interests are affected.[2] Similarly, when HMS Albion performed a Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea in 2018, China appeared to reduce economic engagement with the UK. In 2019, the Senior Responsible Owner told us that HMG *** had discussed how to re-engage the Chinese:

    [it] was re-established after *** diplomacy and engagement, there were some decisions that the Treasury had to take about how they were approaching that dialogue, ***. Because of the cross-cutting nature of that, that wasn't a decision that the Treasury could just take alone. So we worked through the coordinating process to get a clear set of choices and decisions ***.[3]

Surveillance
  1. China is often referred to as a surveillance state, using a range of methods from state-of-the-art technology to neighbourhood watch schemes to monitor its citizens and residents. There is near-comprehensive CCTV coverage in Beijing as well as in most other major cities.
  2. The rapid pace of technological development is only increasing this challenge. China is in the process of integrating its world-leading technologies, such as face recognition and artificial intelligence (AI), in order to allow state authorities to track and follow all residents around its cities. Further development and integration of AI would allow monitoring and automated flagging of unusual behaviour or activities.[4]
  3. When, in July 2019, we asked the Intelligence Community about this, China was described as a "totally sensored environment … sensors everywhere and computers making sense of those feeds for individuals to spot [an] anomaly" ***. It was expected that such an environment would "increasingly become the norm *** because this technology is cheap and will be exported".[5] ***.[6]
  4. *** Surveillance of Chinese citizens with access to secret information is particularly acute: individuals working on sensitive areas are subject to travel bans and cannot leave the country without express permission. The Chinese intelligence system is both hugely capable and uncompromising: those convicted of espionage can face the death penalty.[7] ***.
  5. Surveillance in China has also extended to the virtual world. China's well-established domestic technology sector poses a significant challenge in terms of SIGINT collection. The

  1. Written evidence—HMG, 14 September 2020.
  2. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
  3. Oral evidence—*** July 2019.
  4. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
  5. Oral evidence—SIS, *** July 2019.
  6. Oral evidence—SIS, *** July 2019.
  7. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.

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