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CHINA

Chinese Talent Programme participants have pleaded guilty or have been convicted of offences, including economic espionage and theft of trade secrets, export-control law violations, and grant and tax fraud.

(ii) Using UK research to support Chinese interests
  1. While the potential theft of IP may have received the most headlines, China's overt use of UK Academia provides it with just as much of an opportunity to gain an economic advantage over the UK. China directs, funds and collaborates on research—in particular that which might benefit the Chinese military.
  2. The risks of this can most clearly be seen in respect of dual-use technologies—defined as "goods, software, technology, documents and diagrams which can be used for both civil and military applications".[1] One of the problems with this is that the potential military use of dual-use technologies is not always apparent at the beginning of the research project and therefore the initial research is often unclassified. In this way, research on technological innovations - which might later be seen to have a clear military use, and perhaps offer a decisive military advantage - can be readily available via academic engagement.[2]
  3. On the issue of diversion of UK-China joint research for military use, we were told that basic research is often open to collaboration, and individual academics and research groups ***. Universities themselves may intend to commercialise IP, but increasingly need Chinese financial support. Moreover, transfer of tangible or intangible goods to China only requires an export licence if they are in the Control List, or where there are specific concerns about military or Weapons of Mass Destruction end use. Emerging technologies without established military use are often not covered. ***.[3]
  4. It appears highly likely therefore that collaboration on joint UK-China research projects is being exploited for military use ***. HMG noted that research related to engineering or physical sciences was most likely to have a defence use (and therefore was at greatest risk). ***.[4]

    Case study: University of Manchester's National Graphene Institute

    Shortly after President Xi Jinping visited the University of Manchester in 2015, the university's National Graphene Institute was involved in a five-year collaborative research project with the Aero Engine Corporation of China's Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials (BIAM). In a press release, the university stated that this partnership would "accelerate the application of graphene in the aviation industry and other sectors".[5]

  1. www.gov.uk/guidance/controls-on-dual-use-goods
  2. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
  3. Written evidence—HMG, 10 December 2019.
  4. Written evidence—HMG, 10 December 2019.
  5. 'Graphene partnership could deliver next generation of aircraft', press release by the University of Manchester, 7 December 2015.

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