Page:ISC-China.pdf/124

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

CHINA

  1. However, other universities seem to be turning a blind eye to the risk: for example, the University of Surrey received a £7.5m 'donation' to its 5G/6G Innovation Centre from Huawei which it described as a 'key partner' that the university would continue to do research with "unless there were clear and compelling reasons not to do so".[1]

RR. In its quest for economic advantage, China often acts in plain sight—directing, funding and collaborating on academic research for its own ends. In particular, it seeks to benefit the Chinese military through research on dual-use technologies, which is often unclassified in its early stages. There is a question as to whether academic institutions are alive to the threat posed by such collaboration, particularly given that they often accept transfer of Information Data and Intellectual Property as a condition of funding. While some have expressed concern, others seem to be turning a blind eye, happy simply to take the money.

SS. The UK Government must ensure that transparency around the source of foreign donations to Higher Education institutions is improved: a public register of donations must be created by the Department for Education and monitored by the State Threats Unit in the Home Office.

TT. Academia is also an 'easy option' when it comes to the theft of Intellectual Property, by taking advantage of collaborative projects to steal information which is less protected than it might be in the private sector or the Ministry of Defence, for example. The vast number of Chinese students—particularly post-graduates—in academic institutions in the UK that are involved in cutting-edge research must therefore raise concerns, given the access and opportunities they are afforded.


  1. 'UK Universities to stick with Huawei despite Oxford University's decision to suspend funding', CityAM.com, 18 January 2019.

114