and inform the sector. This approach is also driven by an understanding that the threat message is likely to be better received by those involved with research and innovation if it is delivered through a variety of routes, including those responsible for sponsorship, funding and strategic direction.
Project DERWENT also aims to engage directly with Academia to develop protective security guidance and threat briefings, which are tailored for the sector. Given the broad range of academic relationships, the project aims to deliver a core script, in order to ensure a consistent message from those who engage with organisations involved in research and innovation.[1]
- While Project DERWENT certainly has worthy aims, we nevertheless must come back to the fact that, from the evidence given to this Inquiry, HMG is still not clear which areas of research and collaboration it is trying to protect from China. That, surely, must be the first step, to communicate to academic institutions a comprehensive list of the areas of greatest research sensitivity. Unless, and until, this is done, then China is able to direct and collaborate on—unfettered—research that provides it with an economic advantage.
- Furthermore, it is clear that, even if the areas could be agreed upon, the Intelligence Community acknowledge that the Government has little leverage in this area to prevent Chinese research or collaboration. In July 2019, NCSC told the Committee:
at the moment Government has no way of stopping a university collaborating with a Chinese Professor or a Chinese company.[2]
This was echoed in December 2020 by the DNSA, who noted that engagement with Academia could be challenging, given that it "highly prizes its independence".[3]
- Perhaps the only area that is ahead of this rather bleak picture is those academic posts ***. These posts are subject to more stringent vetting controls than other posts.[4] In 2019, DI told the Committee that it was undertaking a programme of work to *** university degree courses that could potentially be utilised for Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes.[5] The Academic Technology Approval Scheme, which students had to apply to in advance of starting such courses, has now been expanded to cover courses which could potentially be utilised for developing Advanced Conventional Military Technology.[6]
- ↑ Written evidence—***, CPNI and NCSC.
- ↑ Oral evidence—NCSC, *** July 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** December 2020.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—DI, 31 July 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—DI, *** October 2020; GOV.UK guidance on the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (accessed 20 October 2020).
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