VV. Unlike other countries, such as the United States (US), the UK has taken no preventative action. This is particularly concerning, as US restrictions on Chinese students will make UK institutions more attractive to those seeking to gain Intellectual Property and expertise. The Research Collaboration Advice Team should submit a quarterly report on the progress and outcomes of its work to the State Threats Unit in the Home Office to ensure there is cross-government awareness of the scale of the issue.
WW. It is clear that the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) is an effective tool. Once the Government has identified the sensitive areas of research that need protecting from China, consideration should be given to ensuring that ATAS certificates are required for foreign nationals undertaking post-graduate study in UK institutions in those areas. Furthermore, we recommend that ATAS be expanded to cover postgraduate doctoral study.
XX. Tackling the threat in relation to Academia could have been an example of the Fusion Doctrine working seamlessly—with each policy department clearly contributing to an overall goal. But, as in so many areas, the devolution of responsibility for security to policy departments means that the ball is being dropped on security. Policy departments still do not have the understanding needed and have no plan to tackle it.
YY. This must change: there must be an effective cross-government approach to Academia, with clear responsibility and accountability for countering this multifaceted threat. In the meantime, China is on hand to collect—and exploit—all that the UK's best and brightest achieve as the UK knowingly lets it fall between the cracks.
121
