Page:ISC-China.pdf/159

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The UK Government Response
  1. report by the Competition and Markets Authority, and leading to the Chinese-owned company withdrawing from the purchase.[1]
  2. CDI further explained the role that DI and its partners play in ensuring the physical security of both MoD and industry sites:
    We’ll also ***, often in conjunction with MI5 and other partners, to ensure that we test the security and efficacy of both our own facilities but also part of the commercial facilities as well***.[2]
  3. DI also plays a role within the National Cyber Force (alongside wider MoD personnel, GCHQ and SIS). The Agencies told us that "the National Cyber Force (NCF) … is expected to deliver a step change in the nation's cyber capability, and enhance the UK's position and reputation as a top-tier cyber power. The growth of the NCF will make increased [offensive cyber] capacity available".[3] The Agencies noted that:
Since the NCF was stood up, on China specifically ***[4]

FFF. The threat posed by Chinese targeting of experts in UK Industry is of concern. While the expulsion of intelligence officers and the disruption of Chinese efforts are to be commended, the lack of prosecutions is worrying. We note that the Government is intending to introduce new legislation that will make it easier to prosecute such behaviour. Convictions under such new legislation would act as a strong deterrent to those contemplating engaging in such relationships.


  1. Written evidence—DI, 31 July 2020.
  2. Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2020.
  3. Written evidence—GCHQ, SIS and MI5, 21 May 2020.
  4. Written evidence—GCHQ, SIS and MI5, 21 May 2020.

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