Page:ISC-China.pdf/171

455. It goes absolutely into deep expertise … [with] active LinkedIn campaigns of reaching out to people ***.

     Then [there are] *** industries of particular interest and concern.

     So it is the full range. ***. The very focused stuff tends to be going after an individual with particular expertise that is then going to accelerate your build ***.^[1]

Case study: Allen Ho

In 2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicted a naturalised United States (US) citizen, Allen Szuhsiung Ho, and the Chinese state-owned enterprise China General Nuclear (CGN), for conspiracy to engage in the production of special nuclear material in China without authorisation from the US Department of Energy. Ho is now serving a two-year sentence.

Ho, a former employee of US nuclear company Westinghouse, worked at CGN for over 20 years. By 2004 at the latest, he had moved into a role recruiting consultants with experience in the US nuclear industry for CGN ***.

Later, Ho assisted CGN with its Small Modular Reactor Program, in order to help them produce nuclear small module reactors ***. ***.

Throughout his time working for CGN ***. ***.^[2]

456. In 2016, it was anticipated that, by 2020, there would be around 90 CGN personnel split between the Hinkley Point C and Bradwell B projects, with the number for Sizewell C to be determined.^[3] While many (if not most) of these members of staff are not expected to be based on site, as we have previously outlined, there is always a degree of risk in granting Chinese nationals legitimate access to these sites. (While not all CGN staff will be Chinese nationals, it is likely that many will be.) The risk in the case of Hinkley Point and Sizewell was explained as arising because the presence of CGN in the sector facilitates access to UK nuclear experts and thereby increases opportunities for espionage.^[4]The level of risk at Hinkley Point and Sizewell is therefore described as ***.^[5] However, were CGN to construct Bradwell, the risks would presumably be more significant, due to the greater access this would provide into the UK's nuclear industry. ***

     ***^[6]

457. Even though Chinese nationals are unlikely to be granted the level of security clearance necessary for unescorted access to sensitive parts of a nuclear power station, the very fact of

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1. Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
2. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
3. Written evidence—CPNI, February 2016.
4. ***
5. Written evidence—HMG, 13 November 2020.
6. Written evidence—HMG, 13 November 2020.