Page:ISC-China.pdf/179

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Espionage and influence

In terms of the threat to the Energy sector from disruption, the potential impact of offensive cyber operations can be seen from the 2016 and 2017 attacks on the Ukrainian energy grid, which caused the temporary loss of power to hundreds of thousands of people. Even relatively small-scale disruptions to electricity generation can have significant knock-on effects. For example, when just two British power generators went offline in August 2019 due to a lightning strike, over 1,000 train services were cancelled or delayed, and 1.1m people were left without power for up to 50 minutes.[1] ***.[2] ***.[3] ***.[4]

A lack of diversity in the infrastructure is also an issue. ***. ***.[5] ***.[6] ***.[7]

***.[8]

Chinese cyber actors have also conducted Computer Network Exploitation against UK and international companies *** within the Energy sector *** [9]

***.[10]

NNN. Unlike the Civil Nuclear sector, the Energy sector appears to provide China with less potential for leverage, as it does not have the same long-term reliance issues that we see in the Civil Nuclear sector. Nevertheless, there are concerns in relation to the threat to the Energy sector from economic espionage (particularly in the area of new 'green' energy) and disruption.


  1. 'National Grid blames lightning strike for blackout', The Guardian, 20 August 2019; 'National Grid blames lightning strike as it faces Ofgem power cut investigation', Sky News, 20 August 2019.
  2. Written evidence—Cabinet Office, 16 August 2019.
  3. Written evidence—UK Intelligence Community, October 2018.
  4. Written evidence—NCSC, 2017.
  5. Written evidence—NCSC, 2017.
  6. Written evidence—NCSC, 2017.
  7. Written evidence—NCSC, 2017.
  8. Written evidence—NCSC, 2017
  9. Written evidence—NCSC, 2017.
  10. Written evidence—UK Intelligence Community, October 2018; NCSC, 2017.

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