- While there is no doubt that the Civil Nuclear sector has a much more robust regulatory framework than other CNI sectors (notably telecommunications), the effectiveness of the ONR in countering threats from Hostile State Activity (HSA) (which might be considered to be part of its overall remit of ensuring safety standards are met) is unclear. For example, the ONR seeks to verify that electronic components used in key systems in nuclear power stations meet the necessary safety standards ***.[1] It appears that their powers are not designed to address espionage, sabotage or leverage by investors. In 2016 the Government Red Team noted that:
***.[2]
- We questioned whether, should the decision be made to allow CGN to build and operate the proposed Hualong One Chinese-designed reactor, a 'cell' (similar to the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC)[3]) could be introduced to provide security evaluation from within CGN. We were told that such a decision would be taken by the ONR, in conjunction with the (then) Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS).[4]
QQQ. The regulation of the Civil Nuclear sector (through the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR)) is robust. However, we have not been able to evaluate the effectiveness of the ONR in countering Hostile State Activity—indeed, when we tried to ascertain whether the powers held by the ONR were sufficient to protect national security, witnesses from the Agencies and the Cabinet Office were unable to answer. Given the significant Chinese investment in this sector, we recommend that a review of the ONR's ability to counter Hostile State Activity is undertaken.
RRR. Should the Government allow China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) to build and operate the proposed Hualong One reactor at Bradwell (or any other UK nuclear power station), we recommend that the Government set up a 'cell'—a 'nuclear' version of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre—in order to monitor the technology and its operation and address any perceived risks arising from the involvement of CGN in the UK's Civil Nuclear sector.
- Following the 2016 review of the Hinkley Point C decision, the Business Secretary announced an agreement in principle, confirmed by an exchange of letters, with EDF. This 'special share' means that the Government would have the legal right to be able to prevent
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG Red Team, August 2016.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG Red Team, August 2016.
- ↑ The Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) (commonly referred to as the 'Cell') opened in November 2010 under a set of arrangements between Huawei and HMG to mitigate any perceived risks arising from the involvement of Huawei in parts of the UK's Critical National Infrastructure. HCSEC provides security evaluation for a range of products used in the UK telecommunications market. Through HCSEC, the Government is provided with insight into Huawei's UK strategies and product ranges. NCSC, as the national technical authority for information assurance and the lead government operational agency on cyber security, leads for the Government in dealing with HCSEC and with Huawei more generally on technical security matters. (Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) Oversight Board Annual Report 2021.)
- ↑ Oral evidence—NCSC, *** October 2020.
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