CHINA
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we take an actor agnostic approach to making sure that industry is capable of dealing with any of the threats that it could face in the next decades and thinks about how to build that in now, but also how to ensure resilience over time.[1]
NCSC explained that its approach is as much about considering the future intentions and capabilities of states like China, as it is about understanding its current capabilities—particularly given that these have already "changed very dramatically over time".[2]
- CPNI and NCSC contributed to an initiative *** intended to increase understanding of the risks posed *** in the nuclear industry and to identify ways to counter the threat. These include providing ongoing oversight and analysis *** in the sector, and supporting enhanced verification and oversight of companies in the nuclear supply chain.[3] We asked about this programme and were told that the focus was not so much about strengthening personnel security controls, but "about giving us more opportunities to act *** if there is a breach of those processes".[4]
- While these 'upstream' efforts to limit the risks from Chinese investment are welcome, they are just the beginning of the process. The Intelligence Community told the Committee that ***.[5] We were told about the process for accreditation and formulation of reactor designs before the sites go live, and MI5 explained the UK Intelligence Community's role within this process:
***
The Office of Nuclear Regulation is [an] incredibly detailed and a powerful regulator, so we can define things ***[6]
SSS. While it is understandable that ***—given that Hinkley Point C is still under construction, and the remainder had not been approved at the time of writing—the finished projects must be subject to detailed (and continuing) scrutiny by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and the Intelligence Community. We expect to be kept informed of the advice provided by the Agencies and key decision timelines.
Advice to the Energy Sector
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