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Annex A: Covid-19
  1. others when trying to ascertain the future spread and danger of the virus, and for providing a basis on which to downplay China’s role and responsibilities.[1]
  2. In the early stages of the pandemic, open source reporting alleged that China closed internal flights in January 2020 while leaving international flights open until March 2020.[2] If true, this may indicate culpability for the global reach of the virus—whether through negligence, or a deliberate effort to spread the virus beyond China's borders. The Committee therefore questioned whether there was any intelligence on, or intelligence assessment of, the issue. The UK Intelligence Community told us their assessment is as follows:

    At the end of January, China initiated the highest levels of public emergency in all provinces, restricting almost all forms of travel for ordinary citizens. Foreign consular services were required to arrange chartered flights to assist their citizens’ return to home countries.

    During the strictest period of lockdown, approximately 23 January to mid-March, although China did not formally close its borders, the number of total domestic and international flights departing dropped from about 15,000 per day, to 1,800-2,000. Approximately 75% of these flights were domestic. In addition to the epicentre, in the most restricted cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou), which account for the top three busiest airports for international and domestic travel, the number of weekly flights dropped to less than 100, and some weeks less than ten.

    On 28 March China banned foreign citizens entering China, and sought to dissuade Chinese citizens from returning. This marked a change in China epidemic control strategy. After it had officially declared the epidemic under control domestically, having brought the number of cases down to single digits, and declared most provinces virus free, it focused on preventing imported cases entering the country and causing a second wave. ***. [3]

  3. It is not clear from this reply what the proportions were of international and domestic flights which were stopped. ***.
  4. Furthermore the JIO has since advised that, from updated open source data, this "statistic [of 75%] is no longer the most accurate" and that "the flight numbers provided ought to be treated with caution given that in some cases flights included were subsequently found to have been cancelled or the layover in Wuhan aborted whilst others could have been empty return flights or chartered flights evacuating foreign nationals from Wuhan".[4] There is therefore no evidence base on which to assess the validity of the allegations made in the open source reporting.

  1. 'C.I.A. Hunts for Authentic Virus Totals in China, Dismissing Government Tallies', New York Times, 2 April 2020.
  2. 'How China locked down internally for COVID-19, but pushed foreign travel', Economic Times, 30 April 2020.
  3. Written evidence—JIO, 18 November 2020
  4. Written evidence—JIO, 24 February 2022.

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