CHINA
- China prioritises acquiring information on traditional targets of espionage - such as political decision-making and defence. In seeking to establish HMG's position, it casts its net widely. We were told that China hoovers up:
very large amounts of mostly not very damaging information in isolation. There is a big thing here about the aggregation of vast amounts of small insights, but alongside that you cannot be blind to the possibility of small amounts of very deep insights.[1]
(China also uses its acquisition of large amounts of data to enable it to identify, and track, targets: this is covered in the Case Study on Industry and Technology in Part Two of the Report.)
- ***[2] ***
- In recent years, it appears that there has been a general rise in attempts to penetrate the Government or the UK Intelligence Community[3] ***.[4] UK students studying in China can also be targeted. ***.[5] *** both SIS and MI5 told us that the ChIS were most aggressive in ***.[6] ***
- In terms of cultivating influence, HMG told us that the ChIS use the following methods:
- covert support for foreign political parties;
- covert funding and support of groups favourable to the CCP;
- using trade negotiations or investment activities as a platform to influence key decision-makers through bribery and corruption;
- co-opting academics, think-tank employees, former officials and former military figures;
- using cultural and friendship institutions to access key thinkers and decision-makers;
- obtaining and releasing materials to discredit individuals opposed to China's views;
- funding of universities, both to influence research direction towards Chinese priorities and to gain access to prominent individuals through philanthropy, and
- covert media manipulation to undermine support for policies and views deemed harmful to China.[7]
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